tum is a crucial determinant in explaining price momentum for most countries. Fourth, in further examining the momentum phenomenon we fail to establish momentum as a proxy for macroeconomic risk. Fifth, momentum strategies are most profitable when restricted to winner and loser portfolios characterized by proxies of high information uncertainty. In other words, the noisier the fundamental information the slower its incorporation into prices which is in accordance with underreaction of investors. Sixth, we show that momentum profits are especially pronounced for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, we conclude that the momentum phenomenon persists since any arbitrageur wishing to exploit the anomaly is limited by high arbitrage costs. The paper's structure is as follows. In Section I, we review prior evidence on the momentum anomalies both in the U.S. and in European markets. Section II presents the data we use for our study. In Section III, we establish the traditional analysis of momentum anomalies in European equity markets. In Section IV, we subject both anomalies to recent methods of multiple testing.
Section V examines the interplay of both anomalies. Finally, Section VI further explores the link of momentum to the macroeconomy and its interaction with information uncertainty. Section VII concludes.
I. Review of Momentum Strategies

A. Price Momentum
Momentum in individual stock prices has first been documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and their approach to quantify price momentum has become the industry standard. They consider a portfolio that is long in the winner decile and short in the loser decile. These decile portfolios arise from several winner and loser portfolios according to overlapping time periods.
The stocks are ranked monthly according to their performance over the last six months and assigned accordingly to the respective quintile portfolios. These are held for six months. Hence, the winner or loser decile of the associated price momentum strategy of a given month is made up of six portfolios. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find such a price momentum strategy to earn more than 1% above the risk-free rate per month. Even though the decile portfolios usually consist of smaller sized companies with high beta risk, the associated hedge strategy's return cannot be fully explained by significant size or market exposure. The fact that the momentum anomaly is not arbitraged away and still persists is even more intriguing, see Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) .
In explaining the phenomenon of U.S. price momentum, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) examine post-holding period return patterns of momentum portfolios. These patterns favor a behavioral explanation of momentum to be triggered from market participants' under-or overreaction to new information. Overreaction will drive stock prices to levels that are not fundamentally justified giving rise to a subsequent reversion back to their initial level. On the other hand, given limited information processing capabilities, investors may underreact to news which may positively effect a company's fundamental value. Since overconfidence likely renders investors clinging to their original views, this fundamental news may only gradually transmit into the company's stock price. In this case one obtains a flat post-holding period return to a momentum strategy.
Not only is the price momentum anomaly confined to the U.S., it has also been documented in several international studies, such as in Rouwenhorst (1998) for Europe and more recently in Martin (2003, 2005) for a large set of countries. While Rouwenhorst (1999) finds emerging markets to exhibit price momentum, Bekaert, Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1997) contend that momentum in these markets are less consistently profitable. Ball and Brown (1968) have first documented the phenomenon of post-earnings announcement drift which encompasses the tendency of stock prices to drift in the direction suggested by recent earnings surprises. This observation is most likely due to irrational investors failing to fully appreciate the earnings information resulting in a delayed price response, see Bernard and Thomas (1989) . While studies on the post-earnings announcement drift rely on some measure of realized earnings surprise, one may also resort to analysts' earnings forecasts as a more direct measure of earnings expectations. Doing so provides a more timely measure given that non-U.S. companies usually report earnings on an annual basis as opposed to quarterly reporting. The investment strategy building on the above metric is typically referred to as earnings momentum.
B. Earnings Momentum
The implementation of the earnings momentum strategy is similar to the one of price momentum. However, companies are not being ranked dependent on the level of prior returns but prior earnings revisions. As in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) , we build a moving average of cumulated revisions over the prior six months to capture the change in earnings expectations:
REV 6 it = 6 j=0 f it−j − f it−j−1 p it−j−1
where f it is the consensus I/B/E/S estimate in month t of the i-th company's earnings for the current fiscal year. The resulting difference, the monthly revision, is then scaled by the prior month's stock price. We go long in the highest earnings revisions quintile and short in the lowest quintile in any given month according to the value of REV 6 it . Given a holding period of six months the resulting hedge strategy's long leg consists of six overlapping portfolios, as does the short leg.
C. Linking Price and Earnings Momentum
It is straightforward to speculate as to whether price and earnings momentum may reflect the very same mispricing or behavioral bias. In fact, prior studies like Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) find that the U.S. momentum effect is concentrated around subsequent earnings announcements and show that price momentum may partially be explained by underreaction to earnings information. However, they contend that price momentum is not subsumed by earnings momentum since each ranking variable has some incremental predictive power for future returns.
This view is shared by Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2005) who analyze both momentum strategies in an international context. Given that Hong and Swaminathan (2003) only detect price momentum in countries that also exhibit earnings momentum nevertheless makes the case for a closer relation of the two anomalies. Indeed, Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) show that U.S. price momentum appears to be a manifestation of earnings momentum. investment universe's size over time we provide the absolute number of companies to be considered for the momentum strategies across countries in Table II . All in all, we have 59,394 firm-years for the momentum strategies of which one half is concentrated in the U.S. (32,905 firm-years), followed by France (4,255 firm-years) and the U.K. (4,188 firm-years) . Note that the number of available companies is increasing over the years. However, the 2000 peak is followed by a slight setback.
B. Return Data
We consider monthly stock returns in local currency inclusive of dividends by employing total return figures. To represent the respective markets, we choose broad market indices as compiled by Datastream and 3-month-T-bills serve as a proxy for the risk-free rate. Ince and Porter (2006) show that the price momentum effect cannot be detected in the U.S.
when naïvely using raw Datastream data, an observation that appears to extend to other international markets as well, see Leippold and Lohre (2008) . For curing these data issues, Ince and Porter (2006) propose two major adjustments. One is to remove non-common equity from the respective country research lists and the other is to screen for irregular return patterns. Since the former has already been dealt with when deleting secondary issues, we merely have to address the quality of return data. We follow Ince and Porter (2006) in adjusting the return data to allow for reasonable statistical and economic inferences.
Interestingly, we find our comprehensive sample to be hardly confounded by erroneous return data. For instance, the U.S. only requires to change 99 return observations which represents 0.01% of all observations. This fraction is even smaller for Europe for which we adjust 54 observations across all 16 countries. We assume that Datastream has significantly corrected the database in response to the objections of Ince and Porter (2006) . Still, the remaining issues might severely affect statistical inferences and weeding them out renders us even more comfortable with quality of data.
III. Detecting Price and Earnings Momentum
A. Risk and Return
We report descriptive statistics of momentum-based quintile portfolios by country. In computing momentum portfolio returns we follow the standard approach of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) that stipulates the use of overlapping portfolios as described in the previous section. Tables   III and IV give average monthly buy-and-hold return and volatility figures together with two risk proxies, size and beta.
First, we assess the profitability of the price momentum hedge strategy by considering the return differential along with its t-statistic. For the U.S., we obtain a monthly hedge return of 79 basis points at a monthly volatility of 4.4% giving rise to a t-statistic of 2.80. The latter is even higher for the European hedge strategy providing a return of 119 basis points per month but at a lower volatility. Further, using the t-statistic metric, we identify 12 European countries that have anomalous returns on a 5% level or better. If we relax the significance level to 10%, Norway appears to be anomalous as well, leaving Austria, Ireland, and Spain as the only countries for which price momentum is not significant, albeit positive. All in all, we recover prior evidence of pronounced international momentum effects as documented by Rouwenhorst (1998) and Martin (2003, 2005) .
While the loser quintile is sometimes contributing to the return spread, we note that the lion's share is due to the winner quintile. This finding confirms prior evidence that a long-only investor may well benefit from an according momentum strategy. However, the extreme quintile portfolios are the riskiest across all countries since the winner and loser portfolios prove to be more volatile than the portfolios with less extreme price momentum. To judge a systematic risk bias of these portfolios, we compute betas according to the classical regression
where R it denotes the gross return of quintile i, R F t is the risk-free rate and R M t is the market return. For more than half of the countries, the extreme quintile portfolios exhibit high betas, while the remaining portfolios appear to be homogeneous in terms of beta. Moreover, in 14
countries we obtain the highest betas for the loser quintile. Also, there is a size bias for the two extreme quintile portfolios. When we examine size, measured in terms of the logarithm of market value, we find that the two extreme portfolios are mostly populated by small caps. Again, the bias is more severe in the loser quintile, which may in turn explain its conspicuous market exposure. Concerning the price momentum strategy, we usually observe betas that are slightly negative suggesting that one may partially hedge against downside moves of the market.
Regarding earnings momentum, the U.S. strategy earns 58 basis points per month at a volatility that is only half the size of the price momentum volatility. Thus, the according t-statistic is more convincing (4.11). This observation of improved risk-adjusted performance also applies to the European earnings momentum strategy with a return of 83 basis points per month at 1.71%
volatility giving a t-statistic of 7.52. Across Europe, Tables III and IV give rise to 13 significant return differentials while the remaining countries also show positive differentials. These usually reflect the general pattern of price momentum outperforming earnings momentum in terms of return at the cost of higher volatility. Even though earnings momentum exhibits less volatility, risk-mitigating effects with regard to market volatility do only occur in some countries. Compared to price momentum, these earnings momentum differentials seem to be driven less often by the short leg. Again, the extreme quintile portfolios are more risky than the middle portfolios.
However, in contrast to price momentum the long leg has less beta exposure while the short leg of the earnings momentum strategy has a large exposure to this factor. Also, the earnings momentum strategy exhibits negative betas that are usually lower than the one of the according price momentum strategy.
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In the upper graphs of Figure 1 we plot the cumulative returns of the winner and loser quintiles of the earnings and price momentum strategies together with the evolution of an equally-weighted market portfolio. By inspecting the cumulative wealth of the extreme quintiles for the U.S., we find already strong support for the findings in Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) , namely that price and earnings momentum are closely related. For both earnings and price momentum, the loser and the winner quintile portfolios move almost in parallel. In addition, the loser portfolio stays well below the market portfolio and the winner portfolio stays well above it. We observe a similar behavior in Europe, however, both legs of the price momentum strategy are shifted upwards as compared to their earnings momentum counterparts.
Also, inspecting the cumulative momentum returns for the U.S. and Europe over time in the lower graphs of Figure 1 confirms the above statements. Both, price and earnings momentum, seem to be closely tied. Over the nineties the respective return paths nearly coincide. However, the earnings momentum strategy is smoother. While this observation has already been deducted from the descriptive statistics, we additionally learn that the higher volatility figures mainly arise over a short period following the burst of the technology bubble in 1999. Hence, though usually sailing in safe waters, a price momentum investor may experience very turbulent times with volatility well in excess of common market levels.
B. Time-Series Regressions
Since most of the hedge strategies are highly volatile, we wonder whether their high returns are solely compensating for risk. To further examine the performance of our strategies, we therefore check if the long-short portfolio returns can be attributed to common risk factors. Therefore, we adopt the standard approach of Fama and French (1993) and estimate a regression model of the
where R Lt − R St is the return difference of the respective hedge strategy, i.e., the long leg minus the short leg. Regarding the common risk factor portfolios, the market return R M t is represented by some broad market index, the size factor R SM Bt is mimicked by a small cap index minus the risk-free rate, R SCt − R F t , and the value factor R HM Lt is the difference between a value index and the corresponding growth index, R V t − R Gt . Given the factor structure in (3), we can identify the alpha generated by the hedge strategy net of common risk factors. Across all countries, the risk factors explain most of the variation of the loser and winner quintiles' excess returns, thus confirming our descriptive analysis in the previous section. However, concerning the long-short strategies, we note that the model's explanatory power is generally low, confirming prior evidence as in Fama and French (1996) . The resulting alphas are positive and significant at the 5%-level for 15 out of 17 countries whereas Ireland and Austria are the exception to the rule. Note that the hedge strategies are also promising in terms of economical significance. Except for Austria, Ireland, and Spain, 14 countries generate monthly alphas in excess of 90 basis points, the Greek alpha even amounts to 217 basis points, followed by 134 basis points for Denmark and 128 basis points for Germany. Across countries, we note that the alphas are mostly driven equally by the long and the short leg, with a slight tendency towards the long leg. However, the U.S. alpha of 101 basis points is almost entirely due to the short leg. Table VI gives the analogous results of the Fama-French regression for earnings momentum which is not captured by common risk factors as well. All countries exhibit positive alphas which are significant on a 5%-level in 16 cases-the odd one out is Greece. Hence, this analysis significantly hardens our pure return diagnostics. As for the sources to the earnings momentum alphas, we note that long and short legs contribute in equal shares.
To further examine the evolution of both hedge strategies over time, we compute the related alphas for the U.S. and Europe via trailing Fama-French regressions according to equation (3).
We use a 36-month window and plot the resulting alphas in the upper graphs of Figure 2 for price momentum and in the lower graphs of Figure 2 for earnings momentum. To address statistical significance, we additionally provide 95% confidence bands. Regarding price momentum, the hedge strategies' alphas prove to be consistently positive throughout the sample period. While the evolution of price momentum alphas is rather volatile, earnings momentum alphas behave more steadily. Interestingly, the U.S. momentum strategies have experienced severe drawdowns at the end of the nineties while European momentum did not falter.
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IV. Momentum Strategies and Data Snooping
From the previous section we learn that 15 out of 17 countries exhibit positive and significant price momentum alphas and 16 exhibit positive and significant earnings momentum alphas.
However, these alphas may be spurious since they arise from single hypothesis tests performed for each country. Therefore, we will subject both momentum strategies to recent econometric methods that additionally account for multiple testing. These testing procedures either control for the familywise error rate (FWE) or the false discovery proportion (FDP). Below, we will briefly introduce the concept behind these methods.
A. Accounting for Multiple Testing
When simultaneously testing several, say S, trading strategies against a common benchmark, some strategies may outperform others by chance alone. For instance, extensive re-use of a given database or testing one investment idea on various markets of similar nature are prime examples. The latter case applies to our setting since we wish to detect anomalies in several equity markets simultaneously. 1 Therefore, we must combine the individual hypotheses into multiple test procedures that control for the possibility of data-snooping biases. 2
A.1. Methods Based on the FWE
The traditional way to account for multiple testing is to control the familywise error rate, defined as the probability of rejecting at least one true null hypotheses. If this objective is achieved, one can be confident that all hypotheses that have been rejected are indeed false (instead of some true ones having been rejected by chance alone). Many methods that control the FWE exist, the simplest one being the well-known Bonferroni (1936) method, which consists of a plain p-value adjustment, i.e., the initial significance level α is divided by the number of hypotheses under test. Evidently, this method is strict and would result in an outright rejection of any momentum anomaly in all countries. However, it is also important to use a method that provides as much power as possible so that false hypotheses have a chance of being detected. Romano and Wolf (2005) note that the conservativeness of classical procedures like the one of Bonferroni (1936) is due to the fact that these methods assume a worst-case dependence structure of the test statistics. For instance, if we consider the extreme case of all hedge strategies yielding the very same alpha, then individual tests should be carried out at the level α, which obviously is more powerful than the Bonferroni (1936) method. Hence, accounting for the true dependence 1 Parmler and González (2007) examine data snooping biases in price momentum following a different route. They subject several variants of the U.S. price momentum strategy to the bootstrap reality check of White (2000) and conclude that momentum is robust along this dimension.
2 For an overview, see Lehmann and Romano (2005, Chapter 9 (2000) by incorporating a stepwise approach and by employing studentized test statistics. We briefly describe this k-StepM method in Appendix A which ultimately returns a confidence region for the return or the alpha.
A.2. Method Based on the False Discovery Proportion (FDP)
When the number of hypotheses under test is very large, the error control may be rather based on the false discovery proportion than on the familywise error rate. Let F be the number of false rejections arising from a multiple testing method and let R be the total number of rejections. We define the FDP as the fraction F/R, given that R > 0. Otherwise, the FDP is zero. A multiple testing method controls the FDP at level α if P (FDP > γ) ≤ α, for any P , at least asymptotically.
Typical values of γ are 0.05 and 0.1.
Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2007) present a generalized version of the StepM method that allows for controlling the FDP, the FDP-StepM γ method. The method is somewhat complex and the reader is referred to the paper for the details. However, the first step of the method is easy to understand and works as follows. Consider controlling the FDP with γ = 0.1. The method starts with applying the StepM method. If less than nine hypotheses are rejected, the method stops. If nine or more hypotheses are rejected, the method continues and some further hypotheses might be rejected subsequently.
Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2007) compare the k-StepM method to competing methods by means of a simulation study and two empirical applications. They find that all of the methods provide control of the respective error rates. However, the FWE control is too strict, but generalized error rates such as the k-FWE or the FDP allow for more power. Also, the StepM methods turn out to be more powerful than those methods that do not account for the dependence structure of test statistics. Therefore, the methods related to StepM are most suitable for our purpose.
Reconciling the results of the traditional analysis, we are left with 15 positive and significant price momentum alphas and 16 positive and significant earnings momentum alphas. Since this result could have occurred by chance alone, we need to account for multiple testing issues using the methods presented above.
To control the FWE, we consider the k-StepM method for k = 1 which is the appropriate choice given the number of strategies under study. To control the FDP, we pursue the FDP-
StepM γ using γ = 0.1. We keep the significance level constant at 5% across all multiple testing procedures and we present results for the return of the hedge strategies as well as their alphas arising from the Fama-French time series regressions. To account for potential serial correlation in the return series, we use a kernel variance estimator based on the Parzen kernel to studentize the test statistics, see Andrews (1991) . The bootstrap method is the stationary bootstrap with average block size of 12 months. 3
Panel A of Table VII reports the countries' return statistics for price momentum. We provide the lower confidence band c l for the returns using studentized test statistics according to the
StepM and FDP-StepM γ method, respectively. Since we are in a one-sided test setting, we give the lower limits of the confidence interval as computed in the last step of the respective method.
The value in the column labeled rej equals 1 if 0 / ∈ [c l , ∞), which indicates the rejection of capital market efficiency and suggests the presence of an anomaly in the respective country.
Concerning the results for the price momentum returns, we observe 13 rejections by the StepM method. Thus, the FDP-StepM γ is not equivalent to the StepM, since the number of rejections exceeds nine. Moreover, the FDP-StepM γ rejects market efficiency for 15 countries. To conclude, the detected price and earnings momentum anomalies are confirmed by our battery of tests that account for multiple testing issues. By and large, both phenomena prove to be quite persistent and raise the need of sound economic inference.
V. Linking Price and Earnings Momentum
Having ruled out data snooping biases as possible explanations to the momentum effects, we will further delve into the economic nature of these phenomena. In fact, one may wonder whether both price and earnings momentum may be traced back to similar sources, be it a behavioral bias or a compensation for risk.
A. Correlation of Price and Earnings Momentum
When inspecting the cumulative returns in Figure 1 , we have already noted that price and earnings momentum do follow very similar return paths. To quantify this similarity, we simply compute the correlation of selected price and earnings momentum portfolios in Table VIII 
B. Does Earnings Momentum Subsume Price Momentum?
So far we have compiled considerable evidence that price and earnings momentum are closely connected in the U.S. and several European markets. In fact, Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) show that the U.S. price momentum alpha vanishes when additionally controlling for earnings momentum, while the U.S. earnings momentum alpha is robust when vice versa controlling for price momentum. Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) thus reason that price momentum is just a noisy proxy for earnings momentum. While this reasoning is quite persuasive, we wonder whether this observation carries over to other markets. Therefore, when testing for price momentum, we extend the Fama-French setting of Equation (3) to a four-factor model by adding an earnings momentum factor:
where R P M N t refers to the returns to the earnings momentum strategy (positive minus negative earnings revisions). Accordingly, Tables IX to XI contrast the Fama-French results to those of the above four-factor model for all countries and quintile portfolios together with the respective hedge strategies. While the returns to quintile portfolios are usually reasonably captured by the Fama-French factors, the returns to the price momentum strategies are not. Even though these strategies sometimes load to one common factor or another, the adjusted R 2 s are typically quite low. Only for the U.K., France, and Germany do we observe two-digit adjusted R 2 s.
Considering the alphas of quintile portfolios, we note a monotonic increase from loser to winner portfolios. For instance, the monthly U.S. price momentum alpha of 101 basis points results from -90 basis points for the loser quintile and from 11 basis points from the winner quintile. However, this huge spread is fairly persistent when controlling for the earnings momentum factor. The loser quintile's alpha is -80 basis points and the winner quintile's alpha reduces to 1 basis point. As a consequence, the U.S. price momentum is still significant under the four-factor model, contrasting the results of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) .
The general pattern in Europe is different, for instance, for the European strategy we observe the following. While the Fama-French model attains an adjusted R 2 of 9.4% the four-factor model explains 42.9% of the variation in European price momentum returns, cutting down the Fama-French alpha of 146 basis points to insignificant 16 basis points. Across all countries, the addition of the earnings momentum strategy in (4) seems reasonable, since many portfolios exhibit significant loadings to this factor. In particular, the adjusted R 2 of the hedge strategies usually increases by a considerable amount. In this sense, all countries' price momentum alphas are clearly reduced in the four-factor model and so are the corresponding t-statistics. The latter reductions imply statistical insignificance in seven out of 16 European countries: The price momentum alphas of Germany, Switzerland, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Finland are subsumed by the respective earnings momentum factor.
According to Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) , for earnings momentum to be the crucial driver of price momentum the former should be robust when controlling for the latter. Hence, we determine the earnings momentum alphas arising from the following four-factor model
where the original Fama-French model is augmented by the return to the price momentum strategy, R W M Lt (winner minus loser). In Tables XII to XIV, we contrast the Fama-French results to those of the above four-factor model for all countries and quintile portfolios together with the respective hedge strategies. Again, we note that the additional factor leads to a considerable increase in statistical fit. In fact, the adjusted R 2 of the Fama-French model and the four-factor model almost resemble the figures obtaining in the price momentum case. Consistent with Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), the U.S. earnings momentum alpha remains large at 72 basis points with a highly significant t-statistic of 5.14. Given that the European earnings momentum alpha has a t-statistic of 6.76, we suspect that this observation carries over to other countries. Indeed, 13 of 15 original European anomalies remain significant after controlling for price momentum;
only Italy and Norway do cease to have significant earnings momentum alphas.
To summarize, among 17 countries we initially find 15 countries exhibiting significant price momentum alphas in a classical Fama-French setting. Among these 15 countries, seven countries follow the explanation offered by Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) , i.e., earnings momentum subsumes price momentum. These countries include Germany, Switzerland, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Finland. Among the eight remaining four-factor price momentum anomalies, five countries also have four-factor earnings momentum anomalies (the U.S., the U.K., Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark), two countries' earnings momentum alphas cease to be significant (Italy and Norway) and Greece exhibits no earnings momentum at all. Hence, we obtain an aggregate
European pattern that suggests a translation of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) 's argument to European equity markets. Hence, it is all the more surprising why we are refuting their rationale for the U.S..
To uncover whether this reasoning may be confined to special circumstances, we investigate the time series of price momentum alphas arising from a trailing regression. First, we consider price momentum and contrast the respective Fama-French alpha (dashed line) and the four-factor alpha (solid line) in the upper graphs of Figure 3 . For the U.S., we see that the substantial Fama-French alpha is substantially reduced when additionally controlling for earnings momentum. However, by the end of 1999, which coincides with the end of the sample period in Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) , this relation breaks down for some years. Obviously, price and earnings momentum have decoupled following the burst of the tech bubble. This reasoning supports the general view that price momentum typically will be a result of investors' underreaction to fundamental news, while the market frenzy at the end of the nineties is more likely the result from overreaction. As for Europe, the Fama-French alpha is literally neutralized by the earnings momentum factor for the whole sample period. Hence, earnings momentum may be a crucial driver of price momentum from time to time. However, there seem to be other forces at work, too.
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VI. Momentum: Risk or Behavioral Bias?
The results of the previous section essentially suggest that any momentum rationale will be closely linked to the drivers of earnings momentum. In further rationalizing the momentum anomaly we consider two ideas: First, we follow Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) in examining the link between momentum and the macroeconomy. Second, we will analyze the interaction of momentum and measures of information uncertainty.
A. Momentum and the Macroeconomy
It may well be that momentum is closely related to the macroeconomy since momentum may simply reflect future macroeconomic activity or the mispricing of certain macroeconomic variables.
To test the according relation we follow Liew and Vassalou (2000) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) in regressing future GDP growth on lagged values of the Fama-French factors and one of the two momentum factors. Table XV gives the results of a regression of 12-month ahead growth in real GDP on 12-month compounded momentum, either price momentum W M L or earnings momentum P M N , and Fama-French factors M KT , SM B, and HM L. GDP growth is measured as the change in the log of GDP. Given that GDP is available on a quarterly basis, the regressions are also on a quarterly basis. Since the regressions rely on overlapping data the reported t-statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors, see Newey and West (1987) . The sample period is from July 1987 to June 2007.
The following results can be inferred from Table XV . First, we recover the market factor-if significant-to be a leading indicator of future economic growth in some of the countries, i.e., both are positively related as indicated by the positive coefficient estimates. Second, while Liew and Vassalou (2000) report SM B and HM L to also be positively related to future GDP growth in major equity markets until the middle of the nineties we find a negative relation in many countries.
That is, small cap or value stocks suffer prior periods of economic growth whereas they thrive before an economic slowdown. Third, the link between earnings momentum and macroeconomy appears to be strongest in the U.S. and the European aggregate. Given a positive relation instead of a negative one suggests that earnings momentum is a proxy for a macroeconomic risk factor.
However, besides these two we only obtain two further countries where earnings momentum significantly predicts GDP growth, Portugal and Belgium exhibit a positive relation. Hence, there appears to be no definite pattern in linking earnings momentum to the macroeconomy, an observation that carries over to the regression results obtained using the price momentum factor.
While our findings sharply contrast the U.S. result of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) , who detect a negative relation but for a different time period, it is by and large affirmative of the international study of Liew and Vassalou (2000) . They fail to find a link between W M L and GDP growth. Given the strong link between price and earnings momentum documented in this paper we are thus bound to uncover a similar result for P M N . Also, using alternative measures of the macroeconomy like industrial production growth or consumption growth reveals (unreported) results that are qualitatively similar to the ones for GDP growth. Hence, failing to find a definite relation between momentum and the macroeconomy may suggest that momentum is rather due to a behavioral bias, an idea we will explore in the following.
B. Momentum and Information Uncertainty
In this section we will analyze the interaction of momentum and information uncertainty. Especially, the theoretical model of Hong and Stein (1999) posits that firm-specific information only gradually spreads across investors resulting in underreaction and, as a consequence, short-term return continuation. If momentum is due to investors' underreaction to fundamental news the respective price drift should be higher in more opaque information environments for which information diffusion is slowest. In fact, Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) find empirical support for their theory by demonstrating that U.S. momentum strategies are more effective in companies of small size or in companies with low analyst coverage. Besides these two metrics, Zhang (2006) recently provides evidence that the U.S. price momentum strategy is also more effective when limited to high uncertainty stocks as measured by firm age, dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts, stock volatility, and cash flow volatility. Especially, the dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts has been used in prior studies to proxy for differences in opinion, see Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) . For instance, this heterogeneity in beliefs is a necessary condition for price drift in the model of Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2008) , a link that is empirically corroborated for the U.S.
by Verardo (2008) .
Of course, establishing a link between international momentum and information uncertainty would further substantiate the momentum rationale of investors underreacting to fundamental news. Hence, we will examine price and earnings momentum profits for different degrees of information uncertainty. We consider four measures to monthly proxy for information uncertainty:
Analyst coverage, dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts, total stock volatility, and idiosyncratic volatility. Dispersion is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts divided by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast, total stock volatility is estimated using the last three year's monthly stock returns, and idiosyncratic volatility arises from a standard Fama-French regression that also uses the last three year's monthly stock returns. Table XVI gives the results for the price momentum strategy. In particular, we first sort stocks into five quintiles based on past returns. For each quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on one of the four information uncertainty proxies. Obviously, this procedure requires a sufficient number of companies in a given country to deliver meaningful results, hence, we exclude the three smallest countries from the analysis, i.e., Ireland, Portugal, and Austria.
Our findings are as follows. First, we confirm the empirical evidence for the U.S.: Price momentum is indeed more pronounced for stocks with low analyst coverage, higher dispersion in analysts' earnings forecast or higher volatility, be it total or idiosyncratic volatility. Second, the latter findings do not only translate to the European momentum strategy but also to most of the European country strategies. In fact, only Greece and Denmark do totally refute the underreaction rationale. Third, while the earnings momentum results are quite similar among the major equity markets we note that the results for some smaller countries are somewhat muted.
Thus, having gathered substantial support for the underreaction theory one may wonder as to why the momentum anomaly is not arbitraged away. For the U.S., recent research contends that high arbitrage costs prevent rational investors from exploiting the momentum anomaly, see Arena, Haggard, and Yan (2008) for price momentum and Mendenhall (2004) for post-earnings announcement drift. Presumably, the cost of shorting small or illiquid stocks is not offset by the expected momentum profits. In fact, a stock's idiosyncratic volatility is a common proxy for arbitrage costs. Given that we find momentum to be most pronounced in stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility therefore additionally provides a persuasive explanation for the persistence of the momentum effect.
VII. Conclusion
The investigation of a given security mispricing typically addresses two questions: Is the anomaly simply a compensation for risk or is the anomaly real and, if yes, what behavioral bias is driving it? Of course, these questions are only meaningful if the security mispricing is not spurious in the first place. Hence, one needs to safeguard against data snooping biases. We find that both price and earnings momentum are robust with respect to multiple testing issues, reinforcing the growing body of research documenting magnitude and persistence of both anomalies. Researchers have long been speculating about a link between price and earnings momentum. Inspired by the work of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) , we find that European price momentum most likely is subsumed by earnings momentum. However, there are some European countries that do not support such a conclusion. As for the U.S., we especially observe some decoupling of price and earnings momentum following the burst of the tech bubble. In any case, our findings suggest that the price momentum rationale will most likely be related to earnings momentum. Given that momentum does not appear to proxy for macroeconomic risk, we narrow the search in favor of a behavioral-based explanation of the momentum anomaly. In particular, winner and loser portfolios characterized by high information uncertainty give rise to even larger momentum profits. Thus,
given that price momentum largely is earnings momentum in disguise our evidence supports the rationale of momentum being driven by investors' underreaction to fundamental news. Moreover, we attribute the persistence of the momentum anomaly to the fact that significant arbitrage costs prevent investors from its exploitation.
Appendix A: Multiple Testing based on the StepM Method
We describe the k-StepM that allows for controlling the k-FWE. Consider S individual decision problems of the form
each referring to the hedge strategy in country s. We define the parameter θ s in such a way that under the null hypothesis H s , strategy s does not beat the zero benchmark. Given the time series of the hedge strategies, we can compute the test statistic w T,s with an estimate of its standard deviation σ T,s based on the returns and the strategies' alphas according to the Fama-French momentum regressions. In particular, using monthly hedge returns x t,s , we compute average monthly buy-and-hold returns as in Section III. Thus, we have
which we studentize by σ T,s that we estimate using the Parzen kernel. Likewise, the test statistic for the alpha is the intercept from estimating equation (3)
studentized by the estimated standard deviation ofα T,s .
Within the k-StepM method, we first re-label strategies such that r 1 corresponds to the largest test statistic and r S to the smallest one. Then, we need to determine a confidence region of the
Whenever 0 / ∈ [w T,rs − σ T,rs d 1 , ∞), we reject H s for s = 1, ..., S. To control the FWE, d 1 ideally is given by the (1 − α)-quantile of the distribution of the largest 'centered' studentized 4 statistic
among all true hypotheses. However, we do not know which hypotheses are true and we do not know the true probability mechanism P . Therefore, we take the largest difference among all hypotheses and we replace P by a bootstrap estimateP , which implies that the StepM method will only allow for asymptotic control of the FWE. This feature is shared by all other commonly used multiple testing procedures.
If we suppose that we have rejected R 1 < k hypotheses, we can construct a new confidence region to reexamine the remaining (S − R 1 ) smallest test statistics
which is a smaller confidence region, because it typically holds that
we can reject more false hypotheses. Therefore, such a stepwise procedure is more powerful than the single-step method. For the computation of d 2 , we again lack both P and the set of true hypotheses. For P , we use the bootstrap estimateP . However, we now only maximize over the set of hypotheses that have not been rejected yet. Since this is a smaller set, S −R 1 vs. S elements, Table I Country Overview
The table contains descriptive information on the companies that have been domestically traded in the sample period . For further reference we may use abbreviated country codes (Abb.). The screening of country lists depicts the evolution of the countries' samples. First, we give the total size of the country lists followed by the number of companies surviving the first screen for Major listings. The column headed Region contains the number of companies surviving the last screen eliminating regional listings and the like. The Final screen excludes companies which exhibit free-floating market value below 10 million USD. We further describe this final sample giving the number of a country's dead companies (#Dead) and the number of companies with at least one I/B/E/S estimate in the sample period (#I/B/E/S), along with respective percentage values (%-Dead and %-I/B/E/S). The last column gives the earliest month with sufficient Fama-French data. UK  144  128  110  118  129  141  169  167  197  234  264  256  300  268  207  171  227  282  310  366  4188  Ireland  3  5  4  2  3  2  3  5  10  13  16  16  15  15  12  13  16  17  17  20  207   Germany  93  92  105  110  120  188  242  224  213  230  252  264  257  262  237  175  185  202  206  250  3907  Austria  16  18  19  22  25  27  30  32  37  42  38  36  37  30  31  25  27  25  24  30  571  Switzerland  73  84  94  99  100  104  106  106  107  113  121  131  134  142  148  139  128  126  122  150  2327   France  62  82  116  131  133  156  154  165  191  220  256  277  310  327  298  264  261  265  276  311  4255  Italy  13  26  28  31  29  28  27  29  33  39  50  67  67  67  78  70  74  87  97  112  1052  Greece  0  0  0  0  0  0  15  59  79  75  70  82  109  61  50  38  48  43  45  56  830  Spain  13  23  54  69  68  64  62  67  68  69  74  90  90  91  86  79  82  83  81  83  1396  Portugal  0  0  0  0  8  24  26  28  31  36  37  40  42  29  15  10  7  10  12  18  373  Netherlands  54  79  86  91  91  93  95  98  103  110  113  120  132  127  106  86  92  91  88  91  1946  Belgium  30  29  29  31  34  38  39  41  44  45  51  63  66  73  76  64  65  74  68  74  1034   Sweden  19  16  29  31  33  34  48  58  73  101  108  125  131  127  90  71  85  89  92  106  1466  Norway  8  11  12  15  17  17  19  21  27  50  49  51  59  68  51  35  45  54  59  78  746  Denmark  23  37  70  72  77  96  75  67  74  89  89  82  86  88  66  57  54  61  70  68  1401  Finland  0  3  14  18  18  21  25  30  42  49  50  55  64  64  52  54  56  55  54  66  790   Σ  1378  1492  1698  1765  1878  2137  2377  2563  2897  3319  3676  3927  4235  4099  3644  3178  3520  3681  3804  4126  59394 Table III Statistics of Momentum Quintile Portfolios: Price versus Earnings Momentum 1/2
The table gives average monthly buy-and-hold returns and volatility of quintile portfolios that are built monthly dependent on the price momentum ranking (left panel) or dependent on the earnings momentum ranking (right panel). All figures refer to the period from July 1987 to June 2007. We give the return differential of the respective hedge strategies along with the according t-statistic that is in in bold face if significant on a 5%-level or in italics if significant on a 10%-level. The table also gives the two risk proxies beta and size. Both are gathered using data of the whole period, in particular beta arises from a standard CAPM regression and size is measured as the average of log(marketvalue). Note that we do not compute the size proxy for the hedge strategies but give the t-statistic belonging to the return differential. The table gives average monthly buy-and-hold returns and volatility of quintile portfolios that are built monthly dependent on the price momentum ranking (left panel) or dependent on the earnings momentum ranking (right panel). All figures refer to the period from July 1987 to June 2007. We give the return differential of the respective hedge strategies along with the according t-statistic that is in in bold face if significant on a 5%-level or in italics if significant on a 10%-level. The table also gives the two risk proxies beta and size. Both are gathered using data of the whole period, in particular beta arises from a standard CAPM regression and size is measured as the average of log(marketvalue). Note that we do not compute the size proxy for the hedge strategies but give the t-statistic belonging to the return differential. The table's left panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (3) using 240 monthly returns ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 followed by the according t-statistics. The right panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (4). The α-coefficients that are significant on a 5%-level appear in bold face. The table's left panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (3) using 240 monthly returns ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 followed by the according t-statistics. The right panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (4). The α-coefficients that are significant on a 5%-level appear in bold face. The table's left panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (3) using 240 monthly returns ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 followed by the according t-statistics. The right panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (4). The α-coefficients that are significant on a 5%-level appear in bold face. The table's left panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (3) using 240 monthly returns ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 followed by the according t-statistics. The right panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (5). The α-coefficients that are significant on a 5%-level appear in bold face. The table's left panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (3) using 240 monthly returns ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 followed by the according t-statistics. The right panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (5). The α-coefficients that are significant on a 5%-level appear in bold face. The table's left panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (3) using 240 monthly returns ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 followed by the according t-statistics. The right panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (5). The α-coefficients that are significant on a 5%-level appear in bold face. Table XVI Price Momentum and Information Uncertainty
Fama-French Model 4-Factor Model
The table gives return differentials of the price momentum hedge strategy by terciles of different information uncertainty metrics. We first sort stocks into five quintiles based on past returns. For each quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on analyst coverage, dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts, total stock volatility and idiosyncratic volatility (arising from a rolling 36-months Fama-French regression). Below the return differentials we give t-statistics. The two last rows collect the number of countries that exhibit the highest return differential among the respective terciles and the terciles mean ranking in terms of returns. Table XVII Earnings Momentum and Information Uncertainty
The table gives return differentials of the earnings momentum hedge strategy by terciles of different information uncertainty metrics. We first sort stocks into five quintiles based on earnings revisions. For each quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on analyst coverage, dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts, total stock volatility and idiosyncratic volatility (arising from a rolling 36-months Fama-French regression). Below the return differentials we give t-statistics. The two last rows collect the number of countries that exhibit the highest return differential among the respective terciles and the terciles mean ranking in terms of returns. 
